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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
cLli,;TON <1 THOMPSON, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
Tf[t; INDUNTRIAL COMMISSION 
o F Ff,\ If, Wl'Arr E BOARD OF 
11!~,\.LTfT AND rrHF~ STATE 





STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Industrial Commission on April 25, 1966 denied 
plnintiff \1 application for a Motion For Review and 
sp0eifieally held that the Commission adopted the med-
i('nl panel reports filed in this matter (R213). The State-
mr11t of :B'acts filed hy the plaintiff which alleges that the 
Conunit:>sion made a finding that there was "no evidence 
llrnl the seizure activity was directly related to the cir-
"11m:<h111eps :ornrrounding the applicant's employment" is 
L1ke11 ont uf the context with the Commission's Order. 
Tlu~ order of the Commission dated March 28, 1966 states 
I kit '· Tl1p Commission adopts the second panel report and 
1 
finds that there is no evidence that the seizure a(·tiivi. 
was directly related to the circumstanc0s SlllT1 11111 1· 11),, 
the applicant's employment ... " (R210). ln plaintitf, 
Motion for Review (R211), the plaintiff ohjectPd to 11
111 
part of the Order wherein it was stated that there w:
1
, 
"no evidence". In the Commission's suhseqneut Orc]1,1 
dated April 25, 1966, the Commission stated that it 11.r, 
basing its decision denying benefits to plaintiff 0 11 tli" 
panel reports, which discussed and then disagree11 11 itl 
the opinions of the plaintiff's treating physician. 
Plaintiff sustained a head injury in the yeC1r 1'.1~11 
when he was thrown from a horse, ·which sulisc'qur11th 
required an operation at the L.D.S. Hospital in Sal1 
Lake City. An operation was perform0d on the ri.~d1t sid1 
of plaintiff's head, which resulted in impairmt1 11t of hi' 
left hand (R31, 32). Plaintiff testified that he worked fnr 
the Utah Department of Health as a janitor until a1iprrJX· 
imately July, 1964, when it was necessary for him to 11011; 
in a tunnel because of a break in a hot \Yater pipe. Tllf' 
applicant stated that he worked on Thursday arn1 Fri1fa~ 
prior to the week in question in said tunnel (R29). If,, 
testified further that he worked in the tmmel, witli tl11' 
exception of one day, until Friday, July 17, 1!1G4. 
The applicant did not make any complaints to h]; 
employer's supervisors concerning the work in the tunnel 
(R63). On July 18, 1964, the applicant stayc'cl home a1111 
rested and, on the following day, journeyed to }[anti, 
Utah for a family reunion (R65). He assisted iu tll': 
driving to the reunion (R66). The applicant admitted 
on cross-examination that the seizure prohlems 1rr 11 
2 
ii 1111;itcd :d 11 :00 p.m., July Fl, 1964 at his home, and 
11111111 :..; t11l' period from the time he left work until the 
.,.i 1111·1: r11·c11rrecl, he was having a good rest and relaxa-
rioii ( J((i/). rl1 he defendants called the superintendent 
:nul co-1,·orkers of the applicant, who disputed the plain-
tiff's ie.c;t imony as to whether or not he worked alone 
tll 1l1r tumtel and disagreed also as to the length of time 
lie 11urk<'cl in the tunnel. 
~nliseqne11t to the hearing held on February 8, 1963 
illlil l'nrnnant to :)::J-1-77 UCA (1953), the medical aspects 
id this ('HR<' ·were referred to a medical panel. The medical 
p:iI1el filed the initial report on l\Ia~v 28, 1965 (R146). In 
ils r<'port, the medical panel assumed that the work was 
strenuous and, further, that the patient had to work alone 
in tJlC' rwrformance of his job. The medical panel gen-
rrnll)- n 1 1-ie\vecl the medical history and the cranial in-
.Jlll'~' that oceurrecl twenty-five years previousl~v when 
tli1' plaintiff was thrown from a horse. It appeared that 
thP plaintiff snffcretl a subdural hematoma, and surgieal, 
tl1cr<1py was earried out to remove a blood clot, which 
rrsnlte<1 in a residual spasticity of the left upper ex-
lrPrni1 y. Tlie medical panel considered the report of Dr. 
flaniel Nusbaum, who had examined the patient, and 
fortlH'r c011siderec1 the fact that in Dr. Nusbaum's opinion 
the ('Oil di ti 011 ",-ery likely \vas precipitated by fatigue, 
flnirl loss and Plcctrolyte imbalance associated with the 
prrformance of heaYy labor in a confined space.'' The 
medical panel also had knowledge of and discussed the 
opinion of Dr. Krnneth .J. Nielson \\'herein he stated that 
plaintiff's eondition had heen precipitated by strenuous 
nf'tjyjty. 
3 
crhe pa11el, in its last paragraph, deridrd nnd i'111!11,• 
that the cause of the seizures and the resultinir 1 I-> !('1111· 
logical deficits were compatihlr with the pre-r\1,,
1
j 11 ., 
trnuma and the same was previously 1wesent ,,j 11 <·r ·I· • ' j 1111 
time of the original injury twenty-five >'earn ago TL,. 
resulting diffirnlties of the plaintiff were hroug·J1t 1111 1 
additional pathology subsequent to that time, due to a~1 
ing and cerebral arteriosclerosis. After making its fo; 11 
ings that the ca.use of the plaintiff's difficulty \1·a, 11i,. 
to the pre-existing condition, the panel then fom1ll tJi,11 
there was no good evidence that the alleged ocrnne11" 
on or about July 17, 1964 had any direct relafo111sliip 1. 
producing the cerebral status noted or, further, that th 
alleged injury aggravated a pre-existing eornliti11u "' 
sulting in the present cerebral status. 
Subsequent to that time, the plaintiff objertP<l to th 
medical panel report and the matter was set for lieari11~ 
on August 31, 1965. Upon direct examination at tlJi, 
hearing by plaintiff's attorney, Dr. Hebertson, tliairma• 
of the medical panel, stated that the panel felt that tl1·· 
patient had been engaged in strenuous \rnrk during tl1. 
period in question (R164). The doctor testified fmtli1 
that the panel took into account Dr. Nushaum's co11cl11 
sions and opinion. The doctor admitted that prior to tli 1 
filing of the first medical report, the panel was u111Jr.1 
the impression that the plaintiff had a generalize<l seiim1 
lasting for a minute or two, followed by a hollow, <Jc.1·1 
breathing and then the patient had, shortly after aniYi11~ 
at the hospital, a generalized seizure of the grand nm: 
type. Mr. Thurber then asked the doctor that if tlw 
seizures which the plaintiff experienced were morr ,;;PW'1' 
4 
·~ ,,J ·' !n11~·<·r duration than that consid0red by the panel, 
,,]t!>J!lt·r nr not this fact would hear on the findings of 
I iiL p;1]J('l, a]l(l the <1octor ans\Ycred: ''Probably Yer>· 
1i1tk." (HHi!I). 
Jh. Hclwrtso11, testif>·ing at the second hearing 011 
tliis rmittcr. reaffirmed the position of the medical panel 
1,. 11111·t awl stated that the injnr~· complained of on or 
:ii111111 Jul>- J 7, 1!!64 did not have any relationship in pro-
1rwi11g th<> C'<'rchral status of the plaintiff and, further, 
1:1,i1 tlH' itllege<l injm»· clid not aggravate a pre-existing 
,111Hlitio1l. 
The attonw>· for the plaintiff then called Kenneth 
J ~;ielson, a treating physician of the plaintiff. He testi-
fird that the sri,,;1ue was more persistent than the medical 
prrnel lrn<1 assumed in its report (R175). He further 
tc~tified tl1at, i11 his opinion, unusual exertion would likely 
pn•cipibtl~ this sriznre activity. The plaintiff's attorney 
ili('ll call0<l Dr. Daniel Nusbaum and the doctor also dis-
a;.trecr1 'vith the medical conclusions of the panel. 
Bct'anse of the information received b~· the treati11g 
nhn;iria11:-; of the applicant, the file was returned to the 
m111liC'al pand on September 21, 1965 in order that it 
mitd1t reC'onsider the medical problems (R201). Subse-
quent to that time, a second medical panel report was 
filrrl datPd December 3, 1965 (R202, 203). This report 
:dnh•(l that tlw pa11el co11sidered the evidence introduced 
•it the Trnln.strial Commission hearing. The panel then 
l'f•\·ic•wpd in its report Dr. Nielson's and Dr. Nusbaum 's 
irstimo11y. The me(lical panel then made a finding that 
5 
Mr. Thompson did have recunent focal all(] cre 11 .. 1 .. 11·. M \._, ( ]/,t'1 
convulsion activity for twenty-four hours following !i:. 
admission to the hospital. Notwithstanding this fart 
1
.1. ' IC 
panel found that the seizure was not related to the 'Tn 
ployment but, rather, was due to the traumatic> e11repli~lu 
pathy that was probably present since the time of in.inn ' 
twenty-five years ago and was brought about hy arJrJ, 
tional pathology due to age or cerebral encephalopa11 11 
Plaintiff objected to this medical report (R206). H01:. 
ever, when the Industrial Commission set the mattrr , 
down for hearing on March 30, 1966, it was canc(,lll'cl L'. 
the attorney for the plaintiff. 
The Industrial Commission, therefore, ha<l two var) 
ing medical opinions. The members of the mediral p8nrl 
found that the seizures were not precipitated hy the 1·111 ' 
ployment but were, rather, due to a pre-existing cornlitioH 
that was not aggravated by the incidences that occurrrr! 
on July 17, 1964. The treating physicia11s of the plai11tifl 
disagreed and felt that the stre11uous activity of th~ 
plaintiff precipitated the seizures. The Industrial Com 
mission chose to believe the medical panel, as set f11rtl1 
in its Order dated April 25, 1966. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE COMMISSION DID NOT ERR IN 
DENYING BENEFITS TO THE APPLI-
CANT UNDER THE WORKMEN'S COM-
PENSATION ACT. 
The plaintiff in his brief insists that the Commis~iui! 
held that there was no evidence that the seizure Hrfoit1 
was related to the employment. As discussed 1n·cyion,h 
6 
, 1 tlw ~tat0nH·11t of Facts, this statement was taken out lo. 
,:f ,·untex! a11d was not the final Order. The plaintiff, 
Jini\'(•\er, did state the proper issue in his brief under 
P:iinl I wherein he alleged that the question in this case 
1, 11 ]!ether the Commission acted unreasonably in cDn-
i llliling that the seizure activity rendering plaintiff 
, 0 tnlly nml permanently disabled was not related to his 
,•rn] iloym0n t. 
rrhe plaintiff cites m his brief Jones vs. Cal-
i(iJrnia flacking Corp., 121 U. 62, 224 Pac. 2cl 640 
I 19:51 ). The defendant agrees with the outline of facts 
of the Jones case cited by the plaintiff; howenr, dis-
a0'1ws that the case was decided on the basis that the r) , - -
plaintiff el aims. The clef endant also agrees with the gen-
1·rnl rulc8 set forth in the Jo11es case, supra; however, 
11lwt is at issue here is not the well defined law that an 
internal failure which results from over-exertion in the 
rnurse of an applicant's employment is a compensable 
inJnry, even if the internal failure based upon exertion 
aggnm1tes a pre-existing condition. The medical panel 
in both of its reports found and assumed that the plain-
tiff in the week prior to his seizure was doing work that 
1rns s1n'nuous. Secondly, the panel assumed that the 
applirnnt had to work on the tunnel alone, which would 
i11cTPnsc the work loacl. In the second panel report, it 
also assumed that the temperature in the tunnel at the 
time of tlw allegecl incident was high and, notwithstand-
i11g tlirsc Lids, held and found that the cause of the 
>ti·mres was not related to the employment but, rather, 
1ras hrnuglit about by a pre-existing condition which "·as 
11 ot precipitated nor aggravated l)y the working cornli-
7 
tions of the applieant. The pm1el n•pol't, n•ad i11 it, 
tirety, shows that the pmwl hasiC'all~, made hrn fin 1i 111 . 
(1) that there was no causal eo1m<-•ctio11 hetwpp 11 11 
seizures and the applicant's employment; and (2) tli:, 
the seizure activity and resulting difficulties of tJi 1• "1 
plicant were due to a pre-existing co11ditio11 rrlatl,1\ 111 
past injury. Admittedly, Dr. Nusbaum 's a11Cl Dr. ;.;ir·hir 
opinions were different than that of the mecliral Jlill· 
In light of these facts, the J 011cs case strongly ~u,ta: 
defendants' position here. The Supreme Court did 11 , 
hold, as implied in plaintiff's brief, that the ll1Pl'i' Lr 
of unmmal exertion and then a resulting coronnn 'Ir·.: 
sion entitled the applicant to benefits umler thl' \\'11
1
, 
men's Compensation Ad. Rather, tlw Supreme ('1111: 
examined critically and ca rdully the me(1ical tPRtim1111 1 
off ere cl by the parties. 
In that case, two physicians testifie(l on lwlinlf r1f :1. 
applicant. They testified positi,'ely that it wa~ tl1,i 
opinion that the occlusion and th<.' cl<.' a th whieh re~u11.1 
therefrom wer<.' due to e)(ertiou and fatiqlw caused h> 11 
work under the circumstances (kscribecl prior tn i\ 11 
applicant's death. The Commission ruled against \I 
applicant and the Supreme Con rt, after poi11tillg out ti:: 
ther<.' was positive evidence to sustain plaintiff's po,!t'111 
then posed the follo,ving question: ''Is there m1y >:: 
stantial evidence upon which a contrary finding 1·11 11 1 
reasonably he made?" The Court then exnminrrl t 
testimony of the doctor that allege(lly sustained \]It'' 
feudants' position. When the hypotlwtica1 qnN~tio11 '1 
put to that doctor on whether or not the eanse of lle:r 
was related to the employment, the doctor a11s,wri 
8 
. li.i ""'1 n op1111011 rn that it possibly is related in this 
p:irticnla r case but I don't think you can dogmatically 
c•\.\ it IS a ca use." The Court, therefore, pointed out that 
die doctor did 11ot testify contrary to the plaintiff's 
rliwlors Jmt, rather, sustained plaintiff's position and 
iliat (]w rc('ord was void of any substantial evidence which 
r«nmternckd the testimony which showed that the activity 
rd the· appliC'allt induced his death. 
111 tliis particular case, we have no hesitation on the 
11 ,111 of th<• opinion of the medical panel. The medical 
pa11el wns u11equivocal in its position. 'l'hus, the Commis-
·'HJll had th0 dnty to determine which position or opinion 
rn adopt. The Commission adopted the opinions of the 
nJl'dieal pm1el report and incorporated those opinions in 
it~. Order. 
Tlic la\\· is clear and it is fundamental that the Com-
mi~~iou ':'l decision cannot be overturned as arbitrary and 
C<1pricions if it bases its order on competent evidence. 
Jt is f 1rndame11tal that the findings of the Commission on 
l'nnfliding mr11ical testimony cannot be disturbed on 
apprnl. S('e CmnJJbdl vs. Eagle and Blue Bell Mining Co., 
iiI TT. 430, 2:11 Pac. 620, wherein the Court stated as 
tnl!mrs: 
"The testimony taken before the Commission 
consists entirely of the opinions of medical ex-
perts with the exception of the testimony of the 
applicant, Campbell. This testimony is conflicting. 
\Ve can see nothing in this record for review 
PXC<~pt the findings of the Commission based upon 
<·1rnflidi11g testimony. Tlw testimony was com-
pd0nt arnl material to the issues to be determined 
hy the Commission, and on that testimony the 
Commission made its findings. This Court, in pro-
9 
ccedi11g.s of this characte1·, is without pow,. 






upon competent conflicting testimony, '!'It(' o\·i\ 
1
· 
• • •1 ' Ii ' 
so proncles; and the Court has so <1Peid<>d ii 
numerous opinions. It is wholly immatc·rial ti:, 
this Court, or the indiYidual memlwrs UierP~:;' 
might han' come to a-., c1iffe.rei.1t co11dusio 11 111,111 
that reached by the Comm1ss1011. ThP Comrni, 
sion 's firnlings a re binding wh(•11 snpport1>il \,, 
competent, material testimony.'' 
In plaintiff's brief, statements that there WRs IJ!· 
indication that the medical panel did not examine or ]i,11 , 
available the evidence advanced during thu heari11g r,1 
February 8, 1965 are not sustainecl by the rreonl. The fil· 
of the Commission, which is a part of this reeorrl, 11::· 
forwarded to the medical panel on I\Iarch 27, 19()3 ( HW1 
The panel report clearly slmws that the dortorn \11·r, 
conscious of the working conditions of thr appfon'. 
Much to do is made of the fact that the Commi,,irr:1 
failed to conclude \\'hether or not there was nm1s11u: 
exertion. One is remiss to answer this argument lwenu" 
the medical panel in its report assumed unnsnnl 
strenuous activity and based its opinion on these a~snmp 
tions. Therefore, the straw man crea t0d in plaintiff: 
brief is without merit for the reaso11 that tlw fact 111 
unusual exertion was assumNl and, notwithsta11di11C( tin: 
fact, the medical panel concluded that onr-C'xertiou tli1i 
not precipitate the seizure and the resulting difficnlt1 
of the plaintiff. 
The plaintiff spends much time in his lll'ief and ci\1" 
authority contending that unusual exertion whi<'h P11 
cipitates a disabilit~' or death is compensable. The t], 
10 
1 1
,,J,1nt:-: d() J1ot di8agree with this rule. 'l'he plaintiff 
_
11
,wh co11:-:i(krahlc time in his brief in citing authority 
tli;it ;1Jl aggravation of a pre-existing condition is com-
pt n~ahl<· under our compensation act. The defendants 
,;tipnl<ttc that thi:-: is the law. There is no need to argue 
tlte:;c "lcmc11tary and fundamental decisions that have 
111 .1•11 laid down by this Court. 'l'he issue presented in this 
1., 1.,r 1:5 \\'hetlicr or not the Commission acted arbitrary 
, 111 i1 c·<q11ieious in believing the medical panel report 
11 .r:-ni:-; t11r treating physicians of the plaintiff. The plain-
1iff iu his hrief states that the medical panel did not take 
i11 to t·o11c-;icforatio11 certain facts. It is clear from the 
record that the medical panel at its initial meeting did 
not 11an tlH· benefit of the opinions of the treating 
ph~1-sicia11s arn1 their findings in regards to the length of 
,eizun•. rl'JieSP matters were brought out in cross-exami-
:1ntiu11 of tlir l'hairman of the panel, and he stated that 
the rnri:rnce in this fact would not alter his opinion. Not-
1rith~tandi11g the cloctors' response, the Industrial Com-
mi,si011 refenecl the matter back to the medical panel so 
tl1nt it ronld consider the additional information given 
h:· t l1L' tre>a ting physicians. The medical panel then con-
sit1l·1wl these facts, inelucling unusual temperature, un-
usual exertion, unusual sweating and salt loss and 
assnmecl l he facts that the plaintiff is now contending 
nrc in clispnte. As far as the medical panel was concerned, 
tl1l'~t· foets were not in dispute, and based upon these 
forts, t]](' mrdiea1 panel found that there was no con-
111•ctio11 l1ei\H'<'n the seizure and the working conditions 
<lllcl affi rnrn ti vt• lv founcl that the seizures were triggered 
11 
hy a pre-existing condition and tlw aJ.va11ei11g ao·p ri'' , 
- ~ ) [,,. 
applicant. 
The Commission's Order adopted the orm11011, 'J 
the medical panel. The law appears clear that it' tk 
Industrial Commission, in its purported fintli 11g, 11 
Order, refers to a narration of testimony, it mw;1 
assumed that the Commission intended to find tJir, f:
1
,. 
in accordance with said testimony. Therefow', the· \'orn 
mission in holding that it was standing 011 tl1e 11:1: 1, 
report found the facts in conformity therewith. ~' 
S.L.C. vs. Industrial Comrnissio11, 137 Pac. 2d 3G4. lt nm 
be agreed that an Order that does uot set out fincli11gx 11 
fact and conclusions of law separately may lead to so111, 
confusion. To say that the Commission holds that th1>:1 
was no evidence is contrary to the medical panel rc·1ior 
and contrary to the Commission's Order which t! 
plaintiff is appealing. The Commission found the far. 
in conformity with the medical panel report, allll tl1 1 
Court has held in Looser vs. Industrial Commissi()11 "' 
Utah, 9 U. 2d 81, 337 Pac. 2d 965, that: 
"It is obvious from the record that althollgl1 l: 
Commission did not denominate its recitation,, 
facts as 'findings of fact', the facts "·ere J'l'('it,, 
in its Order as extensivelv as thev wonl(l hcr1 
been set forth under a sepa.rate caption. Thl' fiii 11 
ings of fact, however denominate<l and althon;: 
not as articulate in nature ancl form as we m1~ 1 
choose to have them, are not doomed for th11 • 
reasons onlv if substantial compliance with ti . ' 
letter and spirit of the statute has been effr'1';1 
ated, as we think they have here, where but fo' 




The issue presented here is not whether or not there 
1 
.. as unnsu:=il exertion or strain but, rather, assuming 
thr~e fads, whether or not the Commission acted arbi-
tnuy and capricious in adopting competent and material 
rnetlical testimony. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ROBERT D. MOORE 
421 Continental Bank Bldg. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorney for Defenda;n.ts 
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